WHY CLINICAL ETHICS? EXPERIENCE, DISCERNMENT AND THE ANAMNESIS OF MEANING AT THE BEDSIDE / ¿POR QUÉ LA ÉTICA CLÍNICA? LA EXPERIENCIA, EL DISCERNIMIENTO Y LA ANAMNESIS DEL SIGNIFICADO AL LADO DEL PACIENTE / POR QUE A ÉTICA CLÍNICA? A EXPERIÊNCIA, O DISCERNIMENTO E A ANAMNESE DO SIGNIFICADO AO LADO DO PACIENTE

The article asks about the function of clinical ethics. It does so by confronting the assumption that ethics is supposed to help in the solution of concrete problems, relying upon a defined set of principles and rules. The scientific character of such an approach to clinical ethics complements the very understanding of modern medicine as being increasingly scientific and technical; that is, as oriented toward the production of effects. The paper claims that, rather than sharing in the "suspension of meaning" pursued by medicine for the sake of scientific objectivity, the main task of clinical ethics consists of a retrieval, or "anamnesis," of the very questions medicine seems to suspend: the significance of illness and disease, of birth, suffering and death, and of the service to the ethos of generosity that sustains the healing professions. Also, the paper offers a cultural "etiology" of "the suspension of meaning" in ethics, and pleads for a moral reflection that begins with a free and open confrontation with clinical experience. Attending to the moral meaning of concrete situations, the paper argues that formal modes of logical argumentation are only derivative functions of the moral language and, thus, cannot exhaust the broad spectrum of ethical discourse in medicine.

El artículo pregunta acerca de la función de la ética clínica; lo hace mediante la confrontación del supuesto de que la ética debe ayudar a la solución de problemas concretos, a partir de una serie de principios y normas. El carácter científico de este tipo de enfoque de la ética clínica complementa la comprensión misma de la medicina moderna como un campo cada vez más científico y técnico; como orientado hacia la producción de efectos. En el artículo se afirma que, en lugar de compartir en la "suspensión de sentido", perseguido por la medicina en aras de la objetividad científica, la principal tarea de la ética clínica consiste en un sistema de recuperación, o "anamnesis", de las mismas preguntas que la medicina parece suspender: la importancia de la enfermedad y la patología, de nacimiento, el sufrimiento y la muerte, y del servicio al espíritu de generosidad que sustenta las profesiones de la salud. Además, el articulo ofrece una "etiología" cultural de "la suspensión de sentido" en la ética, y aboga por una reflexión moral que comienza con una confrontación libre y abierta con la experiencia clínica. Atendiendo el sentido moral de situaciones concretas, el artículo sostiene que los modos formales de argumentación lógica solo son funciones derivadas del lenguaje moral, y, por lo tanto, no pueden agotar el amplio espectro de discurso ético en la medicina.

Este artigo questiona acerca da função da ética clínica. Para isso, realiza uma confrontação do suposto de que a ética deve ajudar na solução de problemas concretos, baseada numa série definida de princípios e normas. O caráter científico desse tipo de enfoque da ética clínica complementa a compreensão em si da medicina moderna como um campo cada vez mais científico e técnico, isto é, orientado à produção de efeitos. Neste artigo, afirma-se que, em lugar de compartilhar na "suspensão de sentido" perseguido pela medicina em prol da objetividade científica, a principal tarefa da ética clínica consiste num sistema de recuperação ou anameses das mesmas perguntas que a medicina parece suspender: a importância da doença e da patologia, do nascimento, do sofrimento e da morte, e do serviço ao espírito de generosidade que sustenta as profissões da saúde. Além disso, o artigo oferece uma etiologia cultural da "suspensão de sentido" na ética e argumenta sobre uma reflexão moral que começa com uma confrontação livre e aberta com a experiência clínica. Atendendo ao sentido moral de situações concretas, o artigo sustenta que os modos formais de argumentação lógica somente são funções derivadas da linguagem moral e, portanto, não podem esgotar o amplo espectro de discurso ético na medicina.

Why bioethics? On the anamnesis of meaning in medicine.

The history of bioethics rests upon the assumption that, given the growing complexity of medicine, the function of ethics is, first of all, normative: ethics is supposed to help in the solution of concrete problems, and to do so systematically, by relying upon a defined set of principles and rules. The scientific character of such an approach to bioethics complements the very understanding of modern medicine as itself increasingly scientific and technical, that is, as oriented toward the production of effects. Although careful scientific attention to the patho-physiology of disease has unquestionably yielded marvelous advances in modern medicine, its positivist reduction has also created a mind-set that brackets questions of meaning, themselves highly significant to human well-being and to the ethical aspects ofmedicine. The paper claims that, rather than sharing in the "suspension of meaning" pursued by medicine for the sake of scientific objectivity, the main task of bioethics consists in a retrieval, or "anamnesis", of the very questions medicine seems to suspend: the significance of illness and disease, of birth, suffering and death, and of the service to the ethos of generosity that sustains the healing professions. Also, the paper offers a cultural "etiology" of "the suspension of meaning" in bioethics. In addition to a critical integration of positivistic attitudes in medicine and the reduction of moral discourse to the normative, one must mention the basic presumption of a cultural situation that, in the name of post-modernity, raises serious doubts against the possibility of engaging in questions of meaning across moral boundaries. As an alternative, the paper calls for a moral reflection that begins neither with the application of normative principles, nor with an attitude of resignation towards the pursuit of the good; rather with a free and open confrontation with clinical experience that attends to the moral meaning of concrete situations, recognizing that formal modes of logical argumentation are only derivative functions of the moral language, and, thus, cannot exhaust the broad spectrum of ethical discourse in bioethics.

Theological discourse and the postmodern condition: the case of bioethics.

Bioethics reflects--like many other disciplines--the cultural fragmentation and the complexity of what has come to be known as the postmodern condition. The case of bioethics is particularly acute because of its epistemological indeterminacy and the moral pluralism characterizing postliberal societies. A provisional solution to this situation is the retrieval of a neo-Kantian version of ethical formalism in which concern for a consensus on rules replaces universal dialogue on moral content. The article analyzes the possible consequences of this solution with reference to theological ethics. In particular, the reduction of ethical rationality to a function of political regulation on the one hand, and the implicit legitimization of ethical relativism on the other, push any theological contribution to bioethics to the margins. The central methodological issue for the articulation of theological discourse in bioethics is how to avoid the pitfall of privatism while creating the conditions for ethical dialogue across different traditions.